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Book Reviews

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS. By Stephen M. Griffin.' Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press.
$29.95.

1996.

Pp. xii, 216.

Daniel 0. Conkle2
According to Professor Stephen M. Griffin, contemporary
constitutional theory has focused too narrowly on the Supreme
Court's elaboration of constitutional law and, in so doing, it has
neglected the political dimension of American constitutionalism.
Griffin suggests that the most important task of constitutional
theory is to explain the process by which the meaning of the Constitution has evolved over time, but he argues that the Supreme
Court's role in this process has been greatly exaggerated. Griffin's response is to seek "a theory of constitutional change that
will situate the Constitution in the continuous flow of American
political development."3 (p. 7)
Griffin begins by recounting the emergence of judicial review, through which "the Constitution was legalized" (p. 17) by
treating it much like other forms of law. This "legalization of the
Constitution" (p. 18) made it enforceable by the courts, but only
to a limited extent, since the judiciary's institutional limitations
prevented the courts from giving full effect to the Constitution's
many values. As a result, legalization left "large areas of the constitutional order subject to ordinary political change," (p. 18) a
situation that continues to prevail today. Although outside the
domain of "the legalized Constitution," (p. 18) however, these
areas remain a part of the Constitution itself, understood more
broadly as "a text-based institutional practice." (p. 56)
1. Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University.
2. Professor of Law and Nelson Poynter Senior Scholar, Indiana UniversityBloomington.
3. Griffin calls his book an "introduction" to American constitutional theory, but
he emphasizes that it is "a critical introduction." (p. ix; emphasis in original)
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Because the Constitution, on this understanding, includes
non-legal as well as legal dimensions, constitutional change can
occur not only through formal amendments and judicial interpretations, but also through political developments. Over the past
two centuries, formal amendments have been few in number,
leading many to suppose that judicial interpretation has been the
primary source of constitutional change. But Griffin finds this
view "profoundly mistaken." (p. 42) He points to a variety of
political changes that, in his view, should be regarded as "constitutional" but not "legal" changes. (p. 27) Early changes included the development of the President's cabinet and the
emergence of political parties. In this century, the most important constitutional changes, dating to the New Deal, have been
the growth of federal governmental power and, within the federal government, the growth of the President's power in relation
to that of Congress.
In support of his claim that the judiciary plays a secondary
role in the process of constitutional change, Griffin notes that
courts must await litigation and are rarely in a position to institute major constitutional changes on their own. The massive
growth of federal power during the New Deal and thereafter, for
example, was (eventually) permitted by the Supreme Court, but
the Court certainly did not initiate this development. More generally, the pattern of its constitutional rulings suggests that the
Supreme Court is, indeed, the weakest branch of government, 4
and that its power is substantially dependent on that of the popular federal branches. Thus, the Court rarely has invalidated federal, as opposed to state, governmental practices. And when it
has invalidated federal practices, its decisions often have had
political support within one or even both of the political
branches, permitting the Court to profit institutionally from the
separation and dispersion of federal political power.
Griffin devotes the initial portion of his book-almost the
first half of his book-to developing his political theory of the
Constitution and constitutional change. Proceeding from the
theoretical vantage point that he has thus constructed, he then
turns his attention to what he describes as the more conventional
questions of constitutional theory. These questions focus on the
Supreme Court and its role in the American constitutional system. Griffin believes that the contemporary debate on these
4. See Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist521, 522-24
(Wesleyan U. Press, 1961).
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questions is seriously flawed because, in essence, it is politically
naive. He offers a number of interesting insights.
In addressing the fundamental question of whether judicial
review is undemocratic, writes Griffin, we must test the practice
against the standards of contemporary American democracy, not
against the democratic standards of previous historical periods.
And he argues that our contemporary democracy differs from
that "of the Framers and Progressive reformers" in five important respects. In particular, contemporary American democracy
(1) "recognizes the importance of a national guarantee of civil
rights and civil liberties,.., including the right to vote, to run for
office, and to participate in politics generally"; (2) accepts political parties and interest groups as legitimate participants in the
political system; (3) is "populist" in the sense that it depends essentially on direct election and includes "a more direct role for
public opinion in the policy process in the form of polls, initiatives, and referenda"; (4) rejects white supremacy; and (5) rejects
any meaningful constitutional limit on the national political
agenda, assuming sufficient popular demand. (pp. 103-04) Griffin notes that this new democratic reality-the emergence of
modem democracy, especially in the wake of the civil rights
movement-has led in recent decades to significant congressional
protection of individual rights. With Congress taking the lead to
an increasing extent, the role of the Supreme Court in protecting
individual rights has not only become less important, but also
more difficult to defend.
To the extent that the Supreme Court does engage in constitutional decisionmaking, according to Griffin, its efforts continue
to be shaped by the legalization of the Constitution in early
American history. When the Constitution was legalized, the
courts treated it essentially like other forms of law, and, not surprisingly, they turned to various legal sources as they approached
the task of constitutional interpretation. This resulted in a "pluralistic theory of constitutional interpretation" (p. 145) thatwith modifications reflecting more general changes in American
legal practices-continues to be "the best descriptive-explanatory account of constitutional interpretation." (p. 148) According to this theory, the Supreme Court and other courts look to
various sources when they interpret the Constitution, including
"the text of the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, precedent, inferences from the structure of the Constitution, and the
national ethos or tradition." (p. 148) At this descriptive-explan-
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atory level, then, Griffin endorses the theories of scholars such as
Philip Bobbitt, Richard Fallon, and Robert Post.5
At a normative level, by contrast, Griffin notes that the pluralistic theory is defensible only on the assumption that the legalization of the Constitution was and remains desirable. In fact,
claims Griffin, this legalization has created a false distinction between law and politics. Especially when the Supreme Court interprets general constitutional language, such as that of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court cannot readily defend its decisions without "reach[ing] beyond the law to principles of morality and politics." (p. 188) Even so, the Court-supported by
lawyers and constitutional scholars-strives to defend its role as
a "legal" function, one that reflects and maintains the distinction
between constitutional law and ordinary politics. The legal community thus "maneuver[s] to protect the autonomy of the law by
maintaining the legalized Constitution," (p. 188) but its effort is
ultimately in vain. If so, then the legitimacy of the Court's interpretive function may properly be questioned, for it depends in
part on the perpetuation of a fiction.
Griffin's basic project, however, is not so much to critique
the Supreme Court's role in constitutional interpretation, and
therefore the Court's role in the process of constitutional change,
as it is to suggest that the importance of this role has been substantially overstated. Looking to the future, moreover, he suggests that "the most important and pressing constitutional issues
have very little to do with the constitutional doctrines developed
by the Supreme Court." (p. 193) Instead, they relate to continuing power disputes between the President and Congress and to
"the long-term trend toward increased distrust of politicians and
government," (p. 200) a trend that Griffin regards as "the most
disturbing aspect of the contemporary constitutional system." (p.
200)
Throughout his book, Griffin relies on a broad and diverse
array of sources, not only from the law and legal scholarship, but
also from the fields of history and political science.6 He discusses
the work of political scientists of the behavioral tradition, for example, and he uses the concept of the state to help illuminate the
5. See Philip Bobbitt, ConstitutionalFate: Theory of the Constitution (Oxford U.
Press, 1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation,100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1987); Robert Post, Theories of ConstitutionalInterpretation,30 Representations 13 (1990).
6. Griffin's references are easy to find, in footnotes that appear-as they shouldat the bottom of each page.
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role and importance of political institutions in implementing constitutional power. This is interdisciplinary scholarship at its best.
Griffin provides an important corrective to the prevailing
approach to constitutional theory-what he calls the "legalistic
or Supreme Court-centered approach." (p. 5) At the same time,
however, he may go too far in the other direction, underestimating the importance of the Court's role in our constitutional
system. For example, Griffin decries the joint opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.7 According to Griffin, the joint opinion "trumpets the
primacy of the legalized Constitution... [and] asserts that the
Court is at the center of the American constitutional universe;
that its actions best embody the essence of American constitutionalism." (p. 207-08) As Griffin must concede, however, the
view expressed in the joint opinion is broadly accepted in the
legal and political cultures of contemporary America. And this
widespread perception of the Supreme Court-fully accurate or
not-itself emboldens the Court, ensuring that it will continue to
play a powerful role in the process of constitutional change.
Although it may be exaggerated, Griffin's essential claim is
nonetheless insightful and important. In the law schools, at least,
teaching and scholarship about the Constitution have focused
primarily on the legalized Constitution, including the Supreme
Court's protection of individual rights. As Griffin maintains,
however, this focus neglects the more political aspects of American constitutionalism and American constitutional development.
Does this mean that law professors should move away from
their "legalistic," "Supreme Court-centered" approach (p. 5) to
the Constitution and constitutional theory? I think not, at least
not in the sense of changing the basic focus of their teaching and
scholarship. Law schools, after all, are in the business of teaching
students to be lawyers, and potentially judges. As a result, it
seems entirely appropriate for their courses on the Constitution-and for the scholarship of their faculty-to concentrate on
the legalized Constitution, which, as Griffin himself points out,
"provides the framework in which lawyers and judges work." (p.
206)
This is hardly to suggest that Griffin's book is irrelevant to
the work of law professors and their students. The book includes
insightful commentary on the descriptive and normative constitutional questions that law schools customarily confront. Perhaps
7. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Griffin's commentary is directed to general language in the
joint opinion, not to the specific constitutional issues that the Court was deciding.
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more important, Griffin identifies the constitutional issues that
law schools tend to ignore. At the very least, then, this book
should teach constitutional law professors and their students that
their field of study is limited; that the Constitution is more than
the legalized Constitution; and that the Supreme Court's claims
to the contrary are profoundly mistaken.
RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY. Ronald F. Thiemann.1 Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press. 1996. Pp. xiii, 186. Cloth,
$55.00; Paper, $17.95.
Scott C. Idleman2
It is ironic, but not entirely surprising, that our constitutional
jurisprudence of religion has substantially evolved to date without the serious influence of those, such as theologians and clergy,
who are most learned in the nature and practice of religion.
Although religious experts are occasionally summoned for testimonial purposes and courts occasionally advert to authoritative
works on religion-and while there are, to be sure, a handful of
legal professionals who actually have formal training in religion-by and large these are exceptions to the self-styled autonomy of the law. Indeed, despite suggestions to the contrary, law
remains the lawyer's dominion, and the law of religion is no
exception.3
It is precisely this context that makes Ronald Thiemann's
Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy all the more
interesting and valuable a contribution to the field.4 An ordained Lutheran minister and a theologian of genuine caliber,
Thiemann poses in his book the familiar question: "What role
should religion and religiously based moral convictions play
1. Dean, Harvard Divinity School, and John Lord O'Brian Professor of Divinity,
Harvard University.
2. Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. I would like to thank
Elizabeth Staton Idleman and Daniel P. Meyer for their insightful comments.
3. For a recent exhortation to the legal community to engage in a deeper understanding of religion and its relationship to culture and society, see Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Paying the Words Extra. Religious Discourse in the Supreme Court of the United
States (Harvard U. Press, 1994).
4. Thiemann is also the author of Constructinga Public Theology: The Church in a
Pluralistic Culture (Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991) and Revelation and Theology:
The Gospel as NarratedPromise (U. of Notre Dame Press, 1985), as well as the editor of
The Legacy of H. Richard Niebuhr (Fortress Press, 1991).

